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I. Introduction 
ON THE CARE AND FEEDING OF A GIFT HORSE: 
THE RECURRENT COST PROBLEM AS THE 
RESULT OF BIASED PROJECT DESIGN 
by A. Mead Over, Jr. 
Recently, the distinction between the "capital cost" and the "recurrent 
cost" of a development project has received substantial attention among 
practitioners of development economics as a result of a growing perception 
that there exists a "recurrent cost problem" in many developing countries. 
According to Peter Heller of the International Monetary Fund, a principal 
symptom of the problem is that "throughout the developing world the produc-
tivity of public investments and programs that are already in place has 
been seriously jeopardized by the failure of governments to provide adequately 
for their operation and maintenance over time" (Heller, 1979, p. 38). The 
recurrent cost problem is a cause for concern, not only because of the pre-
mature deterioration of past projects, but also because it "cast[s] a 
disturbing shadow on the economic viability of future investment programs" 
(ibid.). The purpose of this paper is to apply some standard tools of 
microeconomic analysis to the recurrent cost problem in an attempt to under-
stand more completely the causes of the problem and to suggest some policy 
initiatives that could help to resolve it. 
In contrast to the prevailing attitude of the literature on the recurrent 
cost problem, reviewed in the next section, I argue that recipient nations 
may often be maximizing their own welfares when they reduce the flow of 
recurrent inputs below that prescribed by the project design. It is useful 
to identify two distinct scenarios, either of which could lead the recipient 
to an optimal reduction of recurrent input flow to a project. In the first 
scenario, the project is designed correctly to maximize the recipient's 
welfare subject to all relevant constraints and given all information regarding 
technology and future prices that is available to project designers. We 
may describe such a design as ex ante correct. When the design is correct 
in this sense, reduction of recurrent input flow to the project could be 
optimal from the recipient nation's perspective only if some unanticipated 
event occurs to invalidate the original project design. Elsewhere I have 
presented a detailed typology of such "surprises" that could lead to the 
donor's perception of a "recurrent cost problem" and have argued that the 
donor should eliminate the possibility that one of these surprises is the 
cause of any perceived input shortfalls before considering other less innocu-
ous explanations (Over, 1981, pp. 17-53). 
Of course, if surprises were random events, we would expect them to be 
distributed so as to result sometimes in the decision to increase the flow 
of recurrent input to a project. However, the remarks of Heller (1979) and 
other informed observers suggest that the frequency with which recurrent 
input flows are restricted below planned levels exceeds the frequency of 
the excess provision of these inputs to a degree that is inconsistent with 
the hypothesis that surprises are the only cause of recurrent input reductions. 
The implication is that, at least in some less developed countries and with 
respect to some development projects, systematic and persistent forces have 
tended to result in input restriction rather than input augmentation. 
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While the first scenario assumes the original project design to be ex 
ante correct, a second scenario hypothesizes that the design is wrong from 
the beginning. If the design is too ambitious, then it is easy to understand 
that the recipient nation might be led to reduce the flow of recurrent input 
below the planned level in order to maximize its welfare. In this paper, I 
present a model of the interaction between the donor and recipient nations 
during the project design stage. Analysis of the model suggests a mechanism 
which might lead to a systematic "bias" in the design process toward overly 
ambitious projects, thus setting the stage for the second scenario which 
could lead to the LDC's optimal reduction of recurrent inputs. 
The paper is organized into five sections. The next section after this 
introduction, section II, sets the context for the later theoretical discussion 
by defining the term "recurrent costs," briefly reviewing the literature on 
the problem, and suggesting an objective function for the donor country. 
Section III presents and analyzes a model of the interaction between the 
donor agency and the decision-maker(s) in the less developed country (LDC) 
that is the recipient of the development project. In this model, both parties 
have an interest in choosing a project design different from one that would 
maximize LDC welfare for a given level of capital provided by the donor; that 
is, different from one that would be ex ante correct. This section first 
models the LDC's decision to provide recurrent inputs to project, models the 
behavior of the donor, using the donor objective function motivated in section 
II, then presents the Pareto-optimal solution of the model and interprets 
it as an overly ambitious and "biased" project design. The paper then argues 
that it may be rational for the LDC to "starve" the over-designed project of 
recurrent input in order to maximize its own welfare. 
The recurrent cost problem, as it arises in this model, is an example of 
a noncooperative solution to a game similar to the "prisoner's dilemma." 
Section IV presents the payoff matrix implied by this model and then draws 
on the literature on prisoner dilemma games in order to propose possible 
solutions to the recurrent cost problem. 
Section V concludes with a short summary of the argument and further 
policy suggestions. 
II. Recurrent Costs in the Literature·and the Donor's Objectives 
Practitioners of project analysis commonly distinguish between the 
"capital costs" of a project and its "recurrent costs." This paper adopts 
the recent O.E.C.D. definition of recurrent costs as the costs of "goods and 
services (for example, local personnel) required for maintaining and operating 
a given project or programme" (1979, parentheses in the original), and a 
complementary definition of capital cost as the start-up cost of a project, 
particularly those portions of the start-up cost attributable to imported 
goods and services. 
The most complete discussion of the recurrent cost problem is the short 
nontechnical article by Heller already metioned (1979). 1 In this article, 
Heller draws on his own extensive previous work related to recurrent costs 
(1974, 1975a, 1975b, 1975c, 1976, 1977) and on his experience at the I.M.F. 
to generalize about the nature, the causes, and the possible solutions of 
the recurrent cost problem. 
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Heller proposes five explanations for the recurrent cost problem. Two 
of his explanations implicitly accept the hypothesis that projects have been 
correctly designed to maximize LDC welfare and attribute the recurrent cost 
problem to the use of mistaken decision-rules during project operation. 2 
One of his explanations is that projects have been incorrectly designed to 
call for more than the socially optimal amount of recurrent input, but that 
these mistaken designs are due to the slowness with which donor and LDC alike 
have adjusted to the high recurrent expenditure demands of newly popular 
social projects. If the recurrent cost problem were entirely due to these 
three causes alone, improvements in LDC management and planning techniques 
would suffice to solve it, 
However, two of Heller's explanations attribute the recurrent cost problem 
to inconsistencies in the project design and implementation process which are 
difficult to describe as simple mistakes. According to Heller, in some LDCs 
funds cannot be allocated to finance the recurrent inputs of ongoing projects 
because either (1) their alternative use is the support of "activities that 
are preconditions of and concornmitant to the existence of the nation state," 
or (2) the LDC decision-makers "are unwilling to mount an adequate tax effort" 
(1979, p. 38). In other words, projects have been repeatedly designed using 
too small a shadow price for the opportunity cost of public funds. If the 
maximization of LDC welfare is the sincere purpose shared by the donor agency 
and the LDC decision-makers, one must ask why there have not arisen powerful 
incentives to induce all parties to the design process to learn the true 
shadow price of recurrent budget expenditures and to incorporate this informa-
tion in project designs which make smaller demands on this budget. 
An alternative possibility is that all the parties to the decision process 
do not share the objective of LDC welfare maximization. One author who believes 
that the goals of donor agency employees diverge from those of both the LDC 
and the donor country is Judith Tendler (1975), whose perspective is condi-
tioned by her experience as an economist for the U.S. Agency for International 
Development. In her view, a set of constraints and incentives imbedded in 
the organizational structures of donor agencies effectively biases the selec-
tion and design process "toward projects with large foreign exchange components, 
or large projects whose foreign exchange component may be small as a percen-
tage but is large in absolute value" (1975, p. 56). The fact that "development 
assistance entities tend to limit:their financing to the foreign exchange 
component of projects" is an organizational constraint which has contributed 
to this result (ibid., p. 74). However, she goes on to say that: 
This policy [of limiting development assistance to the 
foreign exchange component] has received much attention 
and criticism, and as a result has been modified to a 
certain extent •••• It is surprising to discover that 
as this particular policy has been changing, the ten-
dency toward large import-intensive projects seems to 
have continued unabated •••• Therefore, one suspects 
that the policy of financing import costs might not 
account on its own for the strength of the bias toward 
large capital projects (ibid., pp. 55, 56). 3 
Instead, she suggests that: 
A donor organization's sense of mission relates not neces-
sarily to economic development but to the commitment of 
resources, the moving of money. The individual knows that 
his career ••• will be very much determined by his abili-
ties in this area. [For this reason and because ·a] larger 
project requires less staff time per dollar transferred 
than a smaller one, ••• there is a tendency to gravitate 
toward larger projects.... Furthermore this phenomenon 
is just as characteristic and problematic in the multi-
lateral or bank-type lending institutions so frequently 
proposed as a better substitute for U.S. bilateral lending 
(ibid., pp. 56, 88). 
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The hypothesis that donor agencies and/or their employees attach positive 
value to the size of capital flows successfully explains the observed bias 
for big projects. But three features of the current discussion of the recur-
rent cost problem are inconsistent with the objective functions of donor and 
LDC hypothesized by Tendler. First, some donor agencies express with Heller 
of the IMF the sentiment that LDC decision-makers are sometimes "unwilling 
to mount an adequate tax effort." Second, donor agencies express intense 
concern when project outputs are significantly less than projected, especially 
when this shortfall is attributable to the LDC's inability or unwillingness 
to meet its commitments regarding recurrent inputs. Third, and perhaps most 
telling, is the practice of donors to require a "project agreement" intended 
to commit the LDC decision-makers to supply certain amounts of recurrent 
inputs. 
Taken together, these three observations suggest that the maximand of 
the LDC decision-makers is not itself an argument of the objective function 
maximized by the donor agency and/or its employees. For if the objectives 
of the LDC decision-makers were shared by the donor, any deviation from the 
original design during project operation would be applauded by the donor on 
the presumption that it maximizes LDC welfare and thus donor welfare. Such 
deviations would simply be taken as evidence that the design had failed to 
anticipate one of the stochastic "surprises" mentioned above. The donor 
would prefer not to bind LDC governments to recurrent input commitments on 
the presumption that such commitments could only impede the LDC's welfare-
maximizing adjustment to any unexpected event. 
The objectives of the donor and the LDC could diverge in several different 
ways which would be consistent with these observations. Perhaps the donor 
agency and its employees perceive and maximize the "true" social welfare of 
the LDC, while LDC decision-makers instead maximize the welfare of their own 
elite class. If the project output were a "basic human need," with a high 
income elasticity of demand, this divergence would lead the donor to value 
the project output more highly relative to the alternative uses for recurrent 
input than would the LDC decision-makers. On the other hand, perhaps it is 
the LDC decision-makers who maximize the "true" social welfare of the LDC, 
while donor agencies and their employees attach an inappropriately high 
value on the output of "their" projects.4 As a result of either of these 
two possibilities, or a combination of both of them, the donor would feel 
obliged to constrain the LDC's recurrent expenditure behavior by explicit 
agreements and would express regret when project output is curtailed due to 
an "unwillingness to mount an adequate tax effort." 
gence in the valuation of project output could also 
bias of donor agencies toward big projects, because 
produce more output .• 5 
5 
Furthermore, this diver-
account for the observed 
such projects potentially 
The next section presents a model of the behavior of each of the two 
parties that builds on the assumption that the decision-makers in the donor 
country value the output of a development project instead of (or in addition 
to) the welfare which the LDC derives from that project. 
III. A Model of the Recurrent Cost Problem 
A. The LDC Reaction Function 
Suppose that the preferences of the LDC decision-makers (hereafter 
simply "the LDC") can be represented by the intertemporal welfare function 
WL (y·, qL) ' (1) 
where y and qL represent the constant per period flows of, respectively, 
the output of a development project and other domestic goods and services. 
Project output is produced from a stock of capital goods, K, available y 
only from t.he donor in the first pe:tiod, together with a constant subse-
quent flow of recurrent input, x , according to the production technology: 
y 
y = f(K, x ). y y 
(2) 
The LDC has a fixed amount of recurrent input, x, available in each period 
which it must allocate between the development project·and the production 
of other goods and services. The technology for producing other goods and 
services is: 




X = X - X • q y 
(4) 
Assume that the LDC welfare function (1) and production functions 
(2) and (3) are continuous with strictly positive and continuous first 
partial derivatives and strictly negative second partial derivatives, that 
the first partial derivative with respect to any argument approaches posi-
tive infinity as the argument approaches zero, and that functions (1) and 
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(2) are homogeneous of degree one. The isoquants of the production function 
and the indifference loci of the welfare function will then have the conven-
tional convex-to-the-origin curvature. 
For present purposes, a more useful characterization of LDC preferences 
is a preference ordering over the inputs to the development project. To 
obtain such a reduced-form LDC welfare function, we substitute equations 
(2), (3) and (4) into equation (1), obtaining: 
UL(K ) y' xy • (5) 
This reduced form welfare function directly provides the welfare perceived 
by LDC decision-makers to result from any combination of capital input and 
recurrent input to the development project, taking into account both the 
value of the resulting output and the opportunity cost of the recurrent 
input in the production of other goods and services. It's iBnwelfare loci 
are depicted in Figure 1. 
When the amount of capital is determined exogenously by the donor, 
the LDC's choice problem can be written: 





K = K y y 
L Using subscripts on U to indicate partial differentiation, the first-order 
condition for a solution to problem (6) is: 
uLcx . iz ) = awr. b'._ ~ dqL = o 
X y' y ay dXY aqL dxq 
It can be shown that the function UL is strictly quasiconcave in a neigh-
borhood of any solution to first-order condition (7) so that such a solution 
is indeed a constrained maximum. 
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total amount of recurrent input available to the LDC each year for alloca-
tion between the production of project input and other goods. The curve 
CC gives-the value of x that the LDC would choose for any given value of 
y 
K. It is the LDC's reaction function and is analagous to the Cournot reac-
y 
tion function of the duoply model. Aside from the fact that it intersects 
the left of Figure 1 at some distance away from the corners and that it 
proceeds smoothly from left to right without doubling back on itself, its 
shape over the interval O< K <. K is arbitrary and depends on the nature 
- y -
of the functions which comprise UL The reaction function's slope at any 
value of K can be found by totally differentiating the implicit function 
y 







It can be shown that the sign of UL is strictly positive so that the 
xx 
sign of the slope of the reaction curve depends on the sign of the cross 
partial derivative of UL with respect to the two inputs. But that sign in 
turn depends on the elasticities of substitution characterizing two of the 
functions which comprise UL. Define a to be the elasticity of substitution 
between the two inputs x and K in the production of project output and A 
y y 
to be the elasticity of substitution between project output and other 
goods in the LDC's welfare function WL. In this general equilibrium context 
we can also interpret A as the elasticity of LDC demand for the output 
of the development project evaluated at a certain pair of values of y and qL. 
Then, by using the linear homogeneity of the function WL and f(.), it can 
be shown that 
= sgn (A--cr). (9) 
Thus, the particular shape of the reaction function depicted by the 
curve CC in Figure 1 corresponds to a situation in which the elasticity of 
LDC demand for project output is less than the elasticity of substitution 
characterizing the project production process for values of capital input 
b 
up to K 
y 
As the figure is drawn, for values of donor input greater than 
Kb the relative magnitudes of the two elasticities are apparently reversed, y' 
perhaps because LDC demand becomes more elastic at these large values of 
project output. 
Relation (9) bears an interesting interpretation. If either the sub-
stitution elasticity that characterizes the production process is very 
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small or the elasticity of LDC demand is very large (or both), the reaction 
function will tend to be positively sloped. Thus, in these situations, 
incremental amounts of capital provided by the donor will elicit positive 
incr£~ents in the contribution of the LDC to the project without any policing 
by the donor. On the other hand, in situations where inputs are highly 
substitutable or LDC demand is quite inelastic, incremental amounts of 
capital will elicit reductions in recurrent input supplied by a welfare 
maximizing LDC. An implication is that donors concerned that their inputs 
to certain LDC endeavors be matched by increasing LDC contributions to those 
activities should seek the former situation and shun the latter. 
B. The Donor as a Stackleberg Leader 
Following the discussion of the last part of section II, we assume that 
donor decision-makers maximize WD(y, qD) where y is the flow of project 
output produced (and perhaps consumed) in the LDC and qD is other goods 
produceable with the donor's capital and consumed within the donor country. 
We assume that no trade occurs between donor and LDC so that the donor can 
affect the quantity of y only by its strategy in providing K 
y 
6 
to the LDC. 
The same characteristic of the problem that makes the Cournot hypothesis 
unusually acceptable for the LDC renders it entirely untenable as a 
description of donor behavior. In view of the timing of project inputs, 
no project designer or donor can reasonably be supposed to treat the recur-
rent input to be supplied by the LDC as an exogenous parameter unaffected 
1.0 
by the design decision. In fact, donor participation in the project design 
process might be partially motivated by the donor's desire to estimate the 
LDC's reaction function. Since the ability of the LDC to adjust its 
recurrent input decision after the donor has irrevocably committed most of 
its capital input is a recognized fact of the project design and implemen-
tation process, the donor can be presumed to know that the LDC can ignore 
donor reactions to its recurrent input supply decision -- at least in the 
context of a single project. 7 Thus, the donor can avoid the infinite regres-
sion that can occur in plotting strategy when each party must conjecture 
on the other's beliefs regarding its own and the other's reaction functions. 
If the donor is perfectly informed regarding the LDC's welfare func-
tion and the technologies for producing both project output and the LDC's 
other good, then it can derive equation (7), the LDC's reaction function 
in implicit form. One donor strategy might then be to simply choose the 
level of concessionary project financing which maximizes its own welfare 
subject to project technology, its own resource constraint, the opportunity 
cost to it of that grant capital, and, in addition, its knowledge of the 




K + K = K, y q 
(12) 
and equations (2) and (7), where K is the total amount of capital available 
to the donor and K is the amount of capital allocated to the production of 
q 
other goods qD from which the donor derives welfare. 
In order to depict the donor's choice problem on Figure 1, we first 
construct a right border.of the figure at K = K. Now in the same way as 
y 
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in the Edgeworth-Bowley box, any point in the diagram represents the quadruple 
(x , K, x , K ). The donor's indifference curves derive from substituting y y q q 
equations (2), (11), and (12) into the donor's welfare function if, yielding 
J> (K , X). 
y y 
In Figure 2, we superimpose these indifference curves upon a 
set of LDC indifference curves different from those displayed in Figure 1. 
The downward sloping LDC reaction function represents a situation in which 
the LDC's demand for project output is less elastic than the project produc-
tion technology (A<o) over the entire domain of feasible input combinations.
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The superposition of the two preferences maps graphically displays 
the assumption that the donor and LDC share a common, but not an identical,. 
interest in project output. The southwest corner of the figure represents 
zero inputs to the project and thus zero project output. Since any move 
away from that point increases both welfares, the two nations share an 
interest in moving away from that point toward positive production of y. 
On the other hand, the directions of preferred movement are not identical. 
The donor will prefer moves towards its bliss point above all others, while 
the LDC will prefer moves towards its bliss point. 
Given knowledge of the technology and preferences as summarized by 
Figure 2, the donor's decision problem is to choose a point on the horizon-
tal axis representing an amount K of capital which it will provide to the 
y 
development project. One option of the donor is to use its knowledge of 
the LDC's reaction function to simply choose the point on that function 
that the donor most prefers. In Figure 2, this most preferred point is 
point A, which is a point of tangency with a donor indifference curve and 
yields a higher donor welfare than any other point on the LDC reaction 
-1.:;-
Figure 2 
Preference Mappings of Donor and LDC in Project Input Space (6>a>A) 
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This point is analagous to the Stackleberg equilibrium of duo-
Note that it improves the LDC's welfare relative to any point 
west of A on the LDC's reaction function. 
C. The Pareto-Optimal Solution as a "Biased" Project Design 
Now we are prepared to apply this model of donor and LDC interests in 
order to explain how project designs might be systematical_ly biased in the 
direction of "too much" recurrent input. We continue to assume that both 
the donor and the LDC have perfect information about technology and pref-
erence. Suppose preferences and technology define indifference curves 
in project input space like those of Figure 2. Now consider Figure 3, 
where key features of Figure 2 have been traced without the distracting 
detail of the earlier figure. The donor could choose its Stackleberg 
equilibrium capital donation to the LDC of Ka units of capital, thereby 
y 
attaining a welfare level of if for itself and UL for the LDC. Since the 
a a 
donor need not accept a welfare level lower than if, point A represents 
a 
the donor's "threat strategy" and the starting point for subsequent nego-
tiations. 
While a project design represented by point A increases the welfare 
of both parties when compared to the welfare each would achieve with zero 
production of project output, both the donor and the LDC are aware of the 
superiority of designs represe_nted by points to the northeast of point A 
that lie within the lens-shaped area outlined in Figure 3 by the curves 
labeled if and UL: each of these points is Pareto-superior to point A. 
a a 
A subset of these points lie on the "contract curve" connecting the bliss 
points of the two countries and passing through the tangencies of their 
indifference curves (see Figure 2). These input combinations on the con-
. . 1 d . 10 tract curve constitute Pareto-optima esigns. If the two other parties 
are able to negotiate a binding contract to construct and operate a Pareto-
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optimal project design such as that represented by point B, then both will 
have more welfare than at the Stackleberg solution at point A and neither 
could improve its welfare except at the expense of the other's welfare. 
Thus, both parties have an incentive to negotiate such a contract. 
In order to attain point B (or any other point on the contract curve), 
the project must be designed to maximize a weighted sum of both nations' 
welfare functions, if and if, subject to technology and to both resource 
constraints. However, the purported objective of project design is the 
maximization of only the LDC's welfare, subject only to the resource con-
straints which apply to the LDC. Thus, at first glance, actual project 
design practice seems to conflict with the requirements of a move from 
point A to a point on the contract curve in Figure 3. Instead, the prac-
tice seems to lead umambiguously to a point on the LDC's reaction curve. 
However, suppose that the donor's desire to see its capital inputs 
"properly" valued leads project designers cons,istently. to assign positive 
shadow prices to donor-supplied capital goods which in fact have a vanish-
ingly small opportunity cost to the LDC. Furthermore, suppose that the pro-
ject designer implicitly assigns a value to the good to be produced by the 
completed project which is in excess of the LDC's national willingness-to-
pay for that good. The combined effect of these two "mistakes" in project 
design practice will lead to a project design which is "biased" away from 
the LDC's reaction function and towards the contract curve. 
It is important to note that both nations have an incentive to escape 
from point A towards a point like Band therefore both have a strong incen-
tive to ignore any "errors" in project design which allow the designer to 
produce a design more like point B than point A. If we supplement this 
argument with the observation that both types of overvaluation do seem to 
occur in practice, the possibility that actual project designs are often 
closer to a Pareto-optimal input combination like B than they are to a 
-Pl-
Figure 3 
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point on the LDC's reaction curve seems quite plausible. 
The implicit "contract" between the donor and the LDC could then be 
summarized as follows: the donor agrees to provide Kb units, rather than 
y 
just Ka units, of capital input to the project on condition that the LDC y 
agrees to increase its recurrent input commitment from the xa units it 
y 
would supply in its own self-interest at point A to the xb units that will 
y 
permit the donor and the LDC to jointly attain a Pareto-optimum. In fact, 
16 
the "project agreement" signed by donor and LDC prior to project implementa-
tion often contains language very similar to this except that no reference 
is made to the donor's "threat strategy" at point A. 
D. Opportunity Costs and the Recurrent Cost Problem 
Once the project has been constructed and Kb units of capital have been 
y 
installed, the project manager assumes control and must maintain a flow 
b 
of x units of recurrent input per period in order to keep the project at 
y 
point B. While it is true that the LDC will attain a higher welfare level 
at point B than it would have received at point A, the project manager is 
likely ·soon to become aware that he· can do even better than point B. If 
the manager restricts recurrent input to the project from xb units per 
y 
period to the much smaller level of xc units per period, LDC welfare will 
y 
be even higher than it is at point B. Donor capital is an exogenously 
fixed constant from the viewpoint of the LDC's project manager. Since 
the LDC is a sovereign country and therefore, need not be bound by the 
project "agreement," the manager can maximize LDC welfare by picking an 
input combination on the LDC reaction function. Since a move directly 
south from point B to point C decreases x while leaving K unchanged, 
' y y 
this welfare maximizing move unambiguously decreases project output rela-
tive to point Band increases the LDC's production of its other goods, qL. 
While input combination C is obviously better than combination B from 
the LDC's perspective, the fact that Bis a Pareto-optimum implies that a 
move from B benefiting one party, like that to point. C, must necessarily 
harm the other. Thus, the donor receives less welfare at point C than it 
would receive at B. But the situation looks even worse from the donor's 
perspective when we notice that the donor's welfare at point C is less 
than the donor could have achieved at point A with no effort to cooperate 
at all. While the LDC project·manager may forget point A in his struggle 
to satisfy the constituencies that demand other good, qL, the donor is 
likely to remember point A with poignant regret. Indeed, congressional 
critics of U.S. aid policy have been heard to complain that the U.S. 
Agency for International Development has chosen to build an immense and 
very costly project which exceeds the managerial capacity of the host 
country, when a smaller project would have been within the capacity of the 
host country and, thus, would have been operated more efficiently. If 
17 
we interpret the phrase "within the managerial capacity of the host country" 
as a description of a project that makes smaller demands on managerial 
recurrent input with a high opportunity cost to the LDC, then this complaint 
does sound like an expression of nostalgia for point A in Figure 3. 
There is no way for the donor to purchase project output directly. 
Instead, it attempts to purchase it indirectly by engaging in the project 
design process with the LDC. Here the technologically determined timing 
of capital and recurrent inputs acts to divorce the donor's demand for 
project output from the moment to moment decisions regarding the allocation 
of the recurrent input. Since the donor's demand for project output is 
not operationally relevant to the project manager while the demands for 
recurrent input in alternative uses are ubiquitous, the project manager 
allocates recurrent resources away from the project and towards the produc-
t·ion of those alternative goods. 
If donor-LDC interaction is confined to single development project, 
HS 
the sovereignty of the LDC implies that the donor will find it difficult 
or impossible to enforce the implicit contract represented by point Bin 
Figures 2 and 3. Although the donor has paid its agreed share of the cost 
of producing a Pareto-optimal quantity of the internationally collective 
good, the LDC .fails to contribute its agreed share. As a result, the amount 
produced is less than at a Pareto-optimum and the LDC becomes a -"free-rider" 
on the donor's contribution. 
IV. The Iterative Game as a Possible Solution to the Recurrent Cost Problem 
A. Case 1: The Donor Knows the LDC's Preferences 
The analysis of the perfect information merit good model presented 
in section III suggests a specific set of possible moves and outcomes for 
the donor and the LDC that together define the payoff matrix of a game. 
By assigning numerical.measures of donor and LJC welfare to the two sets 
of indifference curves in Figure 2, we obtain the specific payoff matrix 
displayed in Table 1. The donor, which must play first, chooses between 
a b a two moves, K and K The donor selects move K if it decides to behave 
as a Stackleberg leader and choose the point on the LDC's reaction function 
that it prefers to all others. The donor would only select Kb if it hoped 
b to induce the LDC to select x and thus achieve a Pareto-optimal input 
allocation. 
If the donor selects move Ka, the LDC will maximize its utility by 
choosing move xa, just as the donor would predict. A Stackleberg equilib-
rium would result. 
b 
On the other hand, if the donor selects move K, the 
LDC has an incentive to choose move xc, which maximizes its own utility 
but inflicts punishing losses on the donor relative to what it could have 
obtained with Ka. Thus, the safe pure strategy for the donor in this game 
is clearly to choose move Ka, where its worst outcome (minimum gain) is 
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five units and it will probably gain ten units. 
However, suppose the LDC believes that the game will be played re-
peatedly over an extended period of time on successive development projects. 
It is no longer obvious that the LDC's best strategy in this "supergame" 
c b 11 
is to play x every time the donor plays K 
In this situation, the LDC might instead decide to respond to Kb with 
the Pareto-optimal move xb in order to reinforce the donor's choice of Kb. 
b b Many repetitions of the move (K, x) would, after all, yield the LDC more 
a a 
utility than many repetitions of (K, x ). The donor's awareness of this 
possibility makes it willing to choose Kb rather than its safe pure strategy. 
However, if the LDC comes to believe that only a few iterations of 
the game remain, this argument for the LDC to respond to Kb with xb no longer 
holds. Anticipating little or no future benefit to offset the foregone 
c b - b . c 12 
advantage of x over x , the LDC may tren begin to respond to K with x • 
At this point cooperation would cea~a and the recurrent cost problem would 
reappear. 
Although diplomats expect strategic behavior in international relations, 
donor agencies seem to have assumed that the act of providing development 
financing automatically guarantees that the interests of the donor and 
recipient will be roughly the same so that the possibility of strategic 
behavior can be ignored. When evidence accumulates that host countries 
may be behaving strategically, donors react with surprise. It seems more 
appropriate to recognize the inherent difference between the interests of 
the donor and those of the LDC and the fact that a free-rider problem is 
inherent in any joint production activity which requires that the donor 
provide its contribution before the LDC is required to provide its share. 
This game theoretic discussion suggests some policy options which could 
encourage Pareto-optimal projects. The LDC's incentives to respond to 
move Kb with move xb will be larger, other things equal, to the extent that 
TABLE l 
Game Representation of the Merit Good Model* 
LDC 's Moves 
Smap x Medium x Large x 
(x) (xa) (xb) 
50 100 70 
Small K A 
( Ka) 









0::, Bi~ K C B 
( K ) 
2 10 15 
*In each cell, lower left number is payoff to donor and upper left 
number is payoff to LDC measured in units of their respective wel-
fares, wD and wL. Cells containing the letters A, B, and C corre-
spond to points A, B, and C in Figures 2 and 3. 
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the LDC is assured of a continued relationship with a donor that both 
remembers and acts on past LDC behavior. Thus, any institutional modifica-
tions which guarantee future availability of project financing to an LDC 
while simultaneously ensuring that donors maintain accurate institutional 
memories of LDC behavior, will tend to encourage the LDC to respond to 
move Kb with move xb rather than xc. Furthermore, if the donor's possible 
moves are expanded to include "Quit Playing," and if the LDC knows that 
donors that stop playing cannot be replaced, the LDC's incentives to take 
seriously its recurrent input commitments will be increased even further. 
B. Case 2: The LDC's Preferences are Unknown 
If it were costless for the LDC to know its preferences regarding 
project output, then iteration of the project design and implementation 
process might suffice to solve the recurrent cost problem. However, even 
for a single person, it is not usually costless to determine and reveal 
preferences for a collective good. Regarding the individual voter, Downs 
(1957) has argued that: 
[e]ven if people do decide to vote, they are not nor-
mally motivated to give any serious study to their 
vote in collective decision processe5, because the 
probable gain from acquiring further information or 
simply reflecting on the information already at hand 
is usually less than the cost. Thus ill-informed 
voting is to be expected.13 
The same principle applies when the individuals in question are 
nations rather than voters. Since determining the welfare function of 
a nation is inherently much more difficult than determining the preference 
ordering of a person, the "participation cost" of a nation in a collective 
decision process requiring preference revelation is extremely high. Unless 
incentives for truthful revelation are correspondingly powerful, participa-
tion cost for a nation could dominate those incentives even when there 
are only two players in the design game, the donor and the LDC. The result 
would be "ill-informed voting" or misrepresentation of LDC preferences. 
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If the participation cost problem simply introduced a random error 
to LDC preference revelation, then preferences would be understated as 
frequently as they would be exaggerated and the donor might disregard such 
errors as unavoidable. However, consider the actual process by which the 
designer is likely to elicit the LDC's preferences. The designer's infor-
mants are typically employees of the ministry which will eventually administer 
the completed project and, thus, may honestly perceive the benefits of the 
project to be high. In fact, these ministry informants may be the very 
LDC citizens who are most likely to overestimate the benefits of this 
particular project and underestimate the benefits from alternative uses 
of recurrent inputs on projects controlled by other ministries. The 
result is a systematic bias in the same direction as the "bias" introduced 
by the incentives to arrive at a Pareto-optimal design. Both biases tend 
toward the creation of "too big" a project requiring "too much" recurrent 
input. 
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v. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
To the extent that the recurrent cost problem is caused or exacerbated 
by either the surprises mentioned in the introduction or the biased project 
designs of sections III and IV, the policy recommendations must be different 
than they would be if the problem were entirely due to the kind of institu-
tional rigidities and inefficiencies emphasized by Heller and reviewed in 
section II above. For whether the LDC's reduction of recurrent inputs is 
an optimal response to a surprise or a welfare maximizing move in an iterative 
game, the fact that the response is driven by an optimization procedure 
implies that it may be modified by appropriately structured incentives. 
If project designs are ex ante correct, and observed recurrent input reduc-
tions are optimal responses to surprises, then the only logical policy 
recommendation is that project designs be made more robust against the unex-
pected.14 But, the frequency of the recurrent cost problem suggests that 
random surprises or exogenous shocks are insufficient to explain it. In 
section III, we developed a model in which it is in the interests of both the 
LDC and the donor to agree upon a project design different from the one that 
would maximize LDC welfare for a given level of capital provided by the donor. 
Since the donor's input is fixed after the beginning of the project, while 
the LDC's input is a choice variable, the LDC can then reduce recurrent input 
to the project below the level agreed upon with the donor. 
The search for poli<oy proposals in this situation must.begin by valuing the 
outcome as it stands. The LDC's move away from the Pareto-optimum succeeds 
in maximizing its welfare, although it disappoints the donor's hopes for 
substantial project output. If the policy objective is to maximize LDC 
welfare from a single project, then the recurrent input reduction is not 
a problem. However, our discussion of the donor-LDC negotiation as an itera-
tive game suggested that this outcome would not be indefinitely repeated 
because the disappointed donors will cease to trust the LDC's to fulfill 
bargains after many similar bargains have been broken in the past. Since the 
Pareto-optimal position is Pareto-superior to the Stackleberg solution that 
is likely to occur if trust breaks down, we believe that the goal of policy 
should be to facilitate the achievement and maintenance of Pareto-optimal 
solutions to the donor-LDC negotiations. 
The fact that the project design is iterated may offer the best hope for 
achieving a stable Pareto-optimal solution to each individual iteration of 
the game. An important ingredient of such a stable situation is donor memory 
of past performance by each LDC. Furthermore, donors must act on their 
memories, only accepting Pareto-optimal designs in LDC's that have kept their 
bargains in the past. 
In·section IV, we discuss the,implication of the fact that budgeting recurrent 
input among projects years in advance is likely to be administratively and 
politically costly to the LDC. Suppose that realistic estimates of the rela-
tive values to the LDC of the outputs from a set of proposed projects are 
currently obtained as the revealed outcome of the actual struggle among the 
various LDC constituencies to win the allocation of recurrent input to "their" 
projects. This struggle, which constitutes the participation cost referred 
to in section IVB, is likely to be painful and expensive for the political 
leadership of the country. The LDC has every incentive to postpone a political 
conflict of this magnitude as long as possible. As a result, unless a donor 
brings to bear extremely strong countervailing incentives, each constituency 
within the LDC is likely to continue to overstate the quantity of scarce 
recurrent input it will be able to command from the government at large. 
In view of the cost to the LDC of determining its own preferences for 
the output of a project, it is unlikely that any single donor will be able 
to construct sufficiently powerful incentives to induce an LDC to alter its 
behavior in this respect. It is conceivable, however, that a coalition of 
donors acting jointly could induce an LDC (1) to reconcile the multiple 
claims on recurrent inputs with projected supplies of those resources; and 
(2) to mak binding agreements with donors regarding recurrent input supplied 
to a specific project. Such a coalition of donors could serve as repository 
of information on past recurrent input performance by the LDC and, thus, 
as the institutionalized "memory" necessary to the solution of the free-rider 
problem by an iterative game. 
There seem to be two fundamental questions that would need to be 
answered before an individual donor would choose to join such a coalition, 
however. First, will it work? In view of the fact that the United States 
Congress has only begun reconciling individual expenditure items with an 
aggregate budget in the last few years and still performs this operation 
crudely and for only a year at a time, it may be utopian to hope for a 
greater degree of political and budgetary sophistication in an LDC. Second, 
if it does work, would it be worth the cost in terms of political instability 
in the LDC and likely accusations of imperialism aimed at the donors. 15 
Only if all the individual donors who frequently give to a given LDC were to 
answer both these questions in the affirmative, would such a coalition be 
likely to be stable. 
If an LDC.were willing and able to implement a planning system which 
reconciled projected demands for recurrent inputs with projected supplies at 
appropriate shadow prices, note that such a reconciliation would not guaran-
tee accurate preference revelation on individual projects. If would guarantee, 
however, that overestimates of recurrent input supply to some projects would 
be offset by underestimates to other projects. If the LDC computes these 
estimates to maximize its own welfare subject to the merit good welfare func-
tions of the various donors, it has an incentive to overestimate the effective 
"price" of project output to those donors whose demands are relatively in-
elastic and to underestimate the effective "price" to the other donors. 
This strategy will require a specific pattern of misrepresentation of LDC 
preferences, which would, in turn, lead to a recurrent cost problem for some 
of the projects and a perceived "excess" flow of recurrent input to other 
projects. The fact that only some projects would suffer from a shortage 
of recurrent inputs while others would seem to benefit would probably console 
the donors. If the donors are encouraged to give more capital more often 
by this outcome, then the LDC's might be the long term beneficiaries of such 
a policy. 
The LDC which empowers its planning agency to reconcile demands for 
recurrent input and to make binding commitments on recurrent input supply 
will then be able to use the enhanced competence of that agency to answer 
other questions of potentially great importance. For instance, Robert Klit-
gaard has asked, "[W]ill [aid projects] be tempting gifts that lure countries 
away from their national goals and into dependency and subservience?" (1975, 
p. 15). Only by carefully determining its long term, as well as its short 
term, goals and the relationship of each project's output to those goals, 
will an LDC be able to judge the "gift horses" it is offered. Thus, if 
there exists a perceptible danger that a given LDC will be lured away from 
its national goals, it may be willing to endure the participation cost of 
preference revelation in its own self-interest.16 
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In the model of section III, capital was assumed to be scarce only to 
the donor. This situation could be altered if a coalition of donors were to 
fix the total amount of capital available to a given LDC for a period, of 
(say) five years. Then, the LDC would be permitted more freedom in disposing 
of this capital than it presently has. If the quantity of capital granted 
were no smaller than it would otherwise be, the LDC's welfare would be unam-
biguously increased by its greater freedom in the allocation of this resource 
among alternative uses. However, since the capital would have a larger 
opportunity cost to the LDC than it does currently, the LDC would be likely 
to treat it less cavalierly than it has an incentive to do under the current 
system. 
In conclusion, we agree with the institutional perspective that some 
of the inefficiency in an LDC bureaucracy could be eliminated to the benefit 
of the nation it serves. However, if the arguments of sections III and IV 
of this paper are correct, then some of the impediments to information flow 
and "proper" allocation of recurrent inputs that today exist in these bureau-
cracies may serve the short-run national purpose of the LDC rather than 
hinder it. For, to the extent that donors forget the history of past LDC 
recurrent input supplies to their own and other projects, it may be in the 
interest of an LDC to hide the fact that it is rationally choosing to exag-
gerate its preferences for a project output during the design stage or 
rationally choosing to reduce recurrent ~nput to a project below the Pareto-
optimal level during the operation stage. Thus, those who seek to solve the 
recurrent cost problem should attend not only to the removal of institutional 
rigidities and informational impediments, but also to the creation of incen-
tives that will guide donors and LDC's alike to avoid re-creating these 
rigidities and impediments. For these institutional obstructions can engender 
errors in project design which, in turn, provide the preconditions for the 
recurrent cost problem. 
Notes 
1 
Hirschman discussed the recurrent cost problem from a microeconomic 
perspective in 1958 (pp. 141-143) and again in 1967 (pp. 56-59, 113-127). 
Heller's (1974) seminal macroeconomic analysis of the problem is founded on 
the simplifying microeconomic assumption that the project specific ratio 
of recurrent to capital expenditures is a fixed constant once the project 
is installed. See Over (1981, pp. 9-16) for a critique of the idea that 
this ratio of "r-coefficient" is a fixed constant. Other recent work using 
variations on the Heller model to study the macroeconomic implications of 
the recurrent cost problem includes that of Montigny and Martens (1978), 
Beazer and Pulley (1978), Burki and Voorheave (1977), and Gray and Martens 
(1980). 
2
Meerman (1981, pp. 168-170) also attributes the recurrent cost prob-
lem to improper decision rules during project operation which inappropriately 
allocate resources away from recurrent inputs. 
3 Indeed, the definition of recurrent costs quoted above from the O.E.C.D. 
is contained in.a news release announcing a recent relaxation of this policy. 
4A more complex model would permit multiple interest groups formed 
from coalitions of individuals drawn from various LDC ministries, from the 
LDC private enterprises, from the LDC citizenry, from various donor agencies, 
and from private enterprises within donor nations. Such a model would remain 
consistent with observed behavior if those coalitions involving donor agency 
personnel value project output more highly relative to its domestic opportunity 
cost than do coalitions involving those LDC decision-makers who ultimately 
allocate recurrent inputs to the project. 
5Another feature of donor behavior that is consistent with this diver-
gence between donors' and LDCs 1. valuations of project output is the tendency 
of donors to fund specific development projects with identifiable outputs 
rather than to provide general budgetary support. If maximization of the 
welfare function of LDC decision-makers were the motive of donors, the latter 
strategy would be more efficient. 
6Project output is thus an "internationally collective good" although 
it may be a strictly private good within the borders of the LDC: e.g., food 
grain produced by a development project in a hungry region. More specifically, 
we are assuming project output to be a merit good. If the donor's objective 
function is generalized to include WL as well as y and qD, the ensuing argu-
ment is largely unaffected although the mathematical results contain additional 
terms. 
7In section IV, we expand our discussion to include the possibility of 
multiple sequential projects. 
8 By an analagous argument, the positively sloped donor reaction func-
tion corresponds to a situation in which the donor's elasticity of demand 
for project output (6) is greater than the elasticity of production tech-
nology over the entire domain. Combining these assumptions, we have the 




If the LDC reaction function is U-shaped as in figure 1, there may be 
two such Stackleberg equilibria. This complication, while interesting, would 
not affect the analysis to follow. 
10 
The locus of Pareto-optimal input combinations is the set of (JS,, xy) 
pairs which satisfy the first-order conditions to the following problem: 
subject to: 
max 
K ' X y y 
D ~Jl 
U (K ,x) = u-. 
y y 
In terms of the reduced form welfare functions, the first-order condition is: 
UL ~ K K 
It can be shown that both ULand the constraint are strictly quasi~concave in 
the neighborhood of any point satisfying the first-order condition so that 
this condition is sufficient as well as necessary for a maximum. 
11
For a lucid presentation of the prisoner's dilemma game and discussion 
of some early conjectures on the effect of repetition on the players' behavior, 
see Luce and Raiffa. (1959, pp. 94-102). 
12
Friedman (1971) and Marshak and Selten (1978) present pathbreaking 
theories of the supergame which formalize the concept of a response in one 
iteration of a game to moves by the other player ·in previous iterations. For 
an alternative model of the evolution of a cooperative behavioral norm in 
a duopoly supergame, see Cyert and DeGroot (1973). 
13
This paraphrase of Downs' argument is quoted from Tideman and Tullock 
(1976, p. 1149), who also provide a lucid demonstration of the destruction 
of one of the demand-revealing tax mechanisms by the phenomenon of participa-
tion cost as the number of voters becomes arbitrarily large (ibid., p. 1156). 
14 
Over (1981, pp. 9-53, 105, 106) discusses this recommendation in more 
detail. 
15of course, LDC's may be expected to object strongly to such coalitions 
of donors. In the summer of 1979, one Sahelian country objected in writing 
to a proposed meeting of donor representatives to discuss current projects 
on that country. Donors that attended the meeting would be refused the right 
to offer more aid. The meeting did not occur. 
16
All of the discussion to this point assumes that the donor's capital 
input is entirely installed at the beginning of the development project, 
while the LDC's recurrent input is allocated thereafter. In its news release 
of May 3, 1979, the Development Assistance Committee of the O.E.C.D. suggests 
that donors begin to consider ways in which they can provide recurrent inputs 
as well as the initial capital input to a project (OECD, 1979). Our model 
L15 
permits us to characterize both the situation in which the donor would find 
this policy to be in its best interest and the situation in which the donor 
would be better served by a more traditional policy of providing only capital. 
Suppose the donor feels unable to enforce an agreement to operate the 
project at a Pareto-optimal point. In this case, it may want to work with 
the LDC's reaction function. According to the analysis of section III, the 
LDC's welfare maximizing recurrent input choice is completely unresponsive 
to variations in donor capital when the LDC's elasticity of demand for pro-
ject output is equal to the elasticity of substitution between capital and 
recurrent input in the project production function. When LDC demand is quite 
inelastic or, alternatively, the elasticity of substitution in production is 
quite high, the LDC's reaction function is negatively sloped as in Figures 
2 and 3 and the LDC responds to incremental capital gifts with decrements 
in its recurrent input contribution. In these situations a system, whereby 
the donor matches recurrent input purchases by the project, might achieve 
more gains for the donor than equivalent expenditures-on additional capital. 
On the other hand, if the production function is extremely inelastic 
and/or LDC demand is quite elastic, the LDC's reaction function will be 
positively sloped. In this case, a donor constrained to the LDC's reaction 
function may find that its own welfare is better served by increments in 
capital alone than by matching contributions to recurrent input purchases. 
For in this case the LDC will, of its own accord, respond to increments in 
capital donation by supplying more recurrent input to the project. 
In the latter situation, where the LDC reaction function is positively 
sloped, rather than supplying a portion of the recurrent input the donor 
may want to increase the value to the LDC of the donor's capital gifts by 
increasing the opportunity cost to the LDC of grant capital. 
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